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I. INTERSECTIONS
The contributions to this volume span the fast growing areas of "law and development", "transitional justice" and "human rights". The participating authors are well aware of the challenges which arise out of the attempt both to cross and to relativise boundaries, as well as to bridge discourses. And, perhaps, the apparent ease with which the authors convened here navigate the complexity of intersecting, in themselves continuously evolving, scholarly discourses and academic-political practices, might gloss over the intricacies of the exercise.
But just how challenging the undertaking carried out by these authors really is becomes clearer when we realise that no area here is, in itself, easily categorised or mapped out with the aspiration of full comprehensiveness. Instead, the present volume intervenes at the crosssection of these three fields at a time in which considerable maturing, reflection and revisiting has been occurring for quite some time in each of the respective areas, prompting us both to take stock now and to highlight the nature of the overlap, dialogue and crossfertilisation of these discourses. The choice of our three areas of interest is by no means arbitrary: while "human rights" (HR) is arguably the "oldest" among the three legal fields in question here, it shares the inner complexity and dynamic content that characterise the other two. Law and development (L&D) is itself a -comparatively -younger field, but one with a tremendously rich, layered and contested history. 1 As scholars in the field have shown and as some of the contributors to this volume further illustrate, L&D brings into dialogue a wide range of legal and non-legal fields, and thus becomes part of scholarly and policy discourses ranging from "development studies", 2 economics and economic geography, 3 trade law 4 to post-colonial studies. 5 A similar intersection of theoretical and deeply practice-driven approaches can be observed in the third area which this book is placing under scrutiny:
transitional justice. While more will be said on this field later in this introduction, it deserves mentioning that, like HR and L&D, transitional justice (TJ) continues to defy a straightforward categorisation, be that with regard to its basic assumptions or its aspirations, 6 its methodological foundations, as well as its theoretical versus practical aspirations. The following introduction seeks to set the stage for this cross-examination among the three fields of scientific inquiry involved, which we understand to include legal as well as socio-economic, cultural and political practice. The latter cluster of connections is of particular importance in view of the acute awareness among TJ scholars of the need both to expand and to deepen their agenda's reach in order to address, with a view to long-term sustainability, the trajectories and the persistence of the social and economic "grievances", 8 "inequalities", 9 "structural violence" 10 or "root causes" 11 of societal conflict, exclusion and silencing. It will do so by first alluding to questions of context with regard to the emergence 2 JE Goldthorpe. and continuing development of the three fields in a wider discursive universe of both "law and society" as well as, more recently, "law and globalisation" debates. 12 By not only situating the three identified areas against this background but also highlighting the interaction among them, we hope to show how any assessment of these fields is bound to be but a momentary snap-shot, which only fleetingly highlights certain features, while, perhaps unduly, obscuring others. In bringing together some of the most renowned experts in the three areas, we hope to shed at least some light on the intricacies as well as the "stakes" -methodological, and ultimately -political -in the areas under discussion here. Based upon the understanding that a primary objective of legal analysis ought to be the identification of the tension of "winning" versus the "losing" interpretations and applications of legal instruments, our aim here is first to relativise the alleged uniqueness of the three fields with regard to long existing, core legal areas -such as contract or tort, administrative or constitutional law. By highlighting how the interaction of such fields has, again and again,
given rise to the formation of "new" legal areas, we can point to the dynamic of mutual responsiveness between legal norms and societal developments. While re-stating this very basic premise of legal sociology might seem trite and unnecessary to some contemporary readers, we argue that this dynamic demands renewed attention in a legal education and professional context that is shaped by at least two powerful trajectories. In the next section, we review the development of the three identified fields against the background of a significant shift which has been occurring both within law schools and within the world of legal practice.
12 For an elaboration of this idea, see Peer Zumbansen, "The Ins 
II. BREAKING DOWN BOUNDARIES: "LAW AND SOCIETY", "LAW AND GLOBALISATION", LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
In the light of the seemingly unfaltering creativity on the part of legal scholars to extend the boundaries of existing legal fields in response to pressures, say, from technological change, 13 social transformation 14 and from the fast proliferating spheres of social and institutional practice 15 , the emergence and rapid consolidation of a "new" legal field has come to be seen as an ordinary event.
16 And yet, it appears as though the memory of truly innovative fieldcreations in law -such as in the exemplary cases of environmental 17 or cyberspace law 18 -are quite short-lived, at least to the degree that scholars when they are confronted with the necessity (and, the opportunity) to reflect upon the ways in which law "reacts" to change, for example, under the rubrics of "internationalisation", or "globalisation", continue to lament the absence of reliable analytical frameworks and definitions. 19 Meanwhile, the examples to be found in a field such as environmental law, which emerged from, and eventually grew beyond, tort law responsibility, 20 or internet law, which both effectively, and irreversibly, pushed beyond the confines of constitutional law and private law, 22 can be seen as important reminders of law's evolutionary nature, 23 causing it to resist ascriptions of simple causality or mere linear trajectory. 24 With these examples in mind, and although we can easily recognise the aspirations among our contemporaries to attribute an adequate label or even a specific status to emerging legal frameworks, we should nevertheless be mindful of the de facto normality of such struggles. In effect, such labelling anxieties multiply in the face of greater complexity, which serve to challenge the law in both form and substance with the alleged "new-ness" of a situation. In other words, law's relation to society in its ever-changing nature has always been a dynamic shaped by the competing forces of change and resistance, misunderstanding, over-reach, trial and error. 25 Compared to the immensely rich, and, at the same time, precarious research and policy agenda of "law and society", 26 the formula "law and globalisation" describes a more institutional undertakings remain marked by a concern which, first and foremost, regards the design of programmes that will provide graduates with the skills to offer optimal legal services in both domestic and global settings. 34 As a result, law school curriculum reformers, in trying to strike a balance between these two universes of legal practice, are prone to add introductory courses (such as "Law and Globalization", "Ethical Lawyering in a Global
Context") to their curriculum, while, often enough, bowing to the pressures of the bar to maintain a distinct focus on core, black letter, "bread and butter" courses. Meanwhile, and despite a long-standing, and continuing, tradition to push for a contextual study of business nation state, remains one in which the majority of legal scholars is either not that interested, or sceptical about. 36 In contrast, then, while the apparently "transnational" scope of EU law appears to be a logical consequence of "Europeanisation" processes, there is also the risk of a distinct blind-side. Pushing the boundaries of the European legal imagination towards a greater appreciation of the significance of studying law from both a comparative and, specifically, from a European and "integrationist" perspective, this energy-consuming effort sometimes has the tendency to push aside and, effectively, to render invisible important advances in the study of different countries' (Member States') law's historical and colonial raises -yet again -important questions about how law should situate itself in relation to the approaches and methods of other disciplines.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS, LAW & DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AS LEGAL FIELDS
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The contributions to the present volume can be read against the above-described background of an increasingly rich overlay of disciplinary engagements with globalisation phenomena. A distinctive trait of these engagements is the recognition that the success of any inquiry depends on the awareness of the methodological challenges arising from the unruly nature of the object or objects under scrutiny. Transitional justice, one of our core fields in this essay collection, is a case in point. 44 The same applies, arguably, to law and development [L&D], a field which has always been an area which can neither be neatly and clearly defined nor boxed into clear-cut categories. L&D has long been a battle field for opposing concepts of law, political and economic order and the role of institutional governance, 45 49 For a brilliant deconstruction of the post-war conceptual division between political and economic scholars not only to acknowledge but also to build upon the idea that many of the challenges pertaining to a law/non-law distinction that had been identified as specific to the development context, were, in fact, detachable from any legal governance framework. Indeed, the inadequacy of the existing legal governance thinking pointed to the need for a different theoretical -but also, doctrinal -attention. 54 It is this realisation that allows for a better appreciation of the questionable foundations of a legal "order", of the embeddedness of legal governance in a particular institutional setting (for example, the "state") and at a particular moment in (geo-political) time. 55 To the degree that the struggle over law "reform" in the context of development is seen as not entirely removed from contestations of the legal (political, economic) order in the domestic context, 56 L&D emerges as a field, which is just as much concerned with the relationship of law to its (particular, local) social environment and context as that has been the case for all other legal theoretical or legal sociological inquiries. 57 But, accepting this perspective also implies accepting the loss of an outside observer's standpoint. Precisely by acknowledging the inseparability of critical legal analysis in the domestic and the "development" context, we lose the comfort of being "outside" the very sphere which we are purporting both to study and to examine in a disinterested manner. 58 Instead, the demarcation of the L&D context from that of one's home legal system and jurisdiction becomes questionable in itself, because the assertions of law's precariousness in the development context apply to the domestic home context with equal force. Upon this basis, the distinction between governance challenges of "there" and "here" appears artificial. Indeed, the distinction seems designed to insulate the domestic context from critique while depicting the development context as deficient and requiring "aid" and assistance. The identification of a series of legal governance questions as arising from within the context of a "developing country" inevitably leads to these questions having to be seen as being already pertinent much "earlier", namely, already present and evident in the context of domestic legal critique.
A striking feature of this contextualisation of L&D as part of a larger exercise in investigating law's relationship to and its role in society, is the way in which the field opens itself up to an engagement and exchange with complementary discourses about regulatory places and spaces. Both legal scholars 59 and sociologists 60 have been scrutinising the conceptual and constituted nature of such regulatory spaces; spaces which escape a straightforward depiction from a single discipline's vantage point. Just as this critique has become pertinent with regard to the analysis of different, specialised regulatory arenas, ranging from labour 61 to corporate law, 62 from environmental 63 to criminal law, 64 altogether suggesting a methodological shift from comparative to transnational law, 65 L&D has become a very active sphere for a renewed, critical and contextual analysis of law in a fast-changing and volatile environment.
This aspect has been underlined, perhaps most tellingly, by the recent approximation of L&D with the field of "transitional justice", which testifies to an increasing awareness among interested experts of the close connections between investigations into the "legacies" of past injustices with programmes of future-directed legal and economic aid. 66 It is this disciplinary overlap and the growing intersections between L&D and TJ which allows for a critical investigation into their "shared logics", 67 as several of the authors to the present collection illustrate. Due to concerns of space, the editors decided to omit the inclusion of one, closely-related field of scholarly analysis -literary critique, which prominently draws on novels and poetry to shed light on the relations between literature and academic trajectories of development, transitional justice and post-colonial studies. 68 Among such literature, we find works that treat themes closely connected to, and often overlapping with, the noted scholarly engagement: here, we find a vibrant "literary" 69 and cultural engagement with Barbarians" (1980) poignantly scrutinise the slippery slope between "us" and "them" that inescapably pervades any "intervention" or "development" context. As Anne Orford has described in the context of public international law's attempts to address transnational military and civil conflict, we need to take a close look at the hidden, hegemonic aspirations of recent instances of "humanitarian intervention". 70 Excavating the challenges of concepts such as "change", "reform" and "progress", as they have been central to seminal transitional 66 81 and is likely to produce a significant increase in our understanding of the intricate connections between development and aid policies, laws and economics, on the one hand, and the continuously proliferating field of transitional justice, on the other. 82 The collected essays in the area of L&D in this volume build on seminal scholarship since the 1970s, a time at which hopes even on the political left were particularly high with regard to the potential for law to play a significant role in the aid and assistance programmes that were being rolled out under the policy directives of the International organisations and the United States. 83 As terms such as "development", "aid" and "reform" would suggest, one of the most treacherous aspects of the associated programmes was the implicit assumption of competence, authority and -arguably -righteousness -in the design and delivery of such "assistance" programmes to countries around the world. 84 Critique against a predominantly Western-and, more precisely, United States-spirited wave of "assistance" and "development"
programmes formed early and consistently, pointing to the pitfalls of policy programmes which all too often prioritised the relevance of private commercial enterprise over the pursuit of public policy, 85 and, in dramatic ways, neglected to account for the causes of the current state of countries now receiving "assistance". 86 Similarly, a poignant critique raised in the context of a number of humanitarian-aid initiatives was the failure of those designing the programme to consider more adequately the deeper, "root" causes of the conflicts at the centre of the interventions.
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A pertinent aspect of the increasing overlap of L&D and TJ is the role of law and, particularly, that of rights. Human rights were central to early assessments of states of "underdevelopment" and, as a consequence, the development of a rights regime, embedded in a system of "rule of law", was seen as an essential prerequisite in the facilitation of societal, legal, economic and political progress. 88 However, as critics have long been arguing, human rights do not exist in a vacuum, but can only be explained within a comprehensive legal system, creating manifold rights and countervailing duties and obligations. 89 In the context of L&D, the critique of rights focused, even at an early stage, on the volatility of human rights assertions in precarious political conditions, characterised by social-economic inequality and great disparages in the actually existing access to justice conditions. Even "advanced" stages of L&D reform, introducing concerns with the "social", fell privy to a convincing critique of the programmes' failure to facilitate and to consolidate a solid rights and entitlements regime, rather than complementing insufficient rule-of-law implements with arbitrary welfare or equity insertions.
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This focus on the centrality -but precariousness -of rights in the context of postconflict, transitional states and emerging economies continues to be a central concern in the evolving regulatory and normative landscape of development and transitional justice. To the degree that human rights have come to represent institutionalised entitlements, which are both instruments of power as well as bargaining chips in struggles over autonomy and These debates, to be sure, occur within an immensely complex context, rich with competing assertions of the conditions and trajectories of human-rights developments and of the interests invested in granting rights to these or other concerns. 91 The scope of such contestations has, however, largely expanded, to the degree that policy concerns as expressed, for example, in the context of development or transitional justice programmes, have become quasi-boundary-less. In other words, questions pertaining to the role of law in post-conflict Iraq or the World Bank's leadership in aid to Africa are, in many ways, no longer confined to these particular destinations. Instead, these concerns have become global in the way that they raise pressing questions which tie issues related to Iraq to those associated with global concerns with security and stability in the Middle East, with human-rights protection, as well as with economic interests and geo-political considerations. Likewise, any attempt even at "helping" or "developing" Africa (or, India, 92 or Latin America 93 ) would have to start by taking into account the complex and intricate history of Africa's role in the world, a history that has been told too often from the colonisers' perspective and is now being told from within.
IV. MAPPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE DISCOURSES: CONVERGENCE, CONTESTATION AND CRITIQUE
The present volume can be read as a contribution to the body of scholarly responses to the changes in global governance since the end of the Cold War, especially in the unfolding "post September 11, 2001" period, which have identified a re-configuration, at the levels of both theory and practice, of formerly isolated fields and concerns, including human rights, law, and development, as well as post-conflict or, transitional justice. 96 The task of surveying each of these fields would be Sisyphean, not only because their boundaries appear, across a survey of various types of literature, as both fluid and porous, but also because the number of publications both within and among them continues to multiply. Furthermore, we have recognised that even the implied standpoint from which one might undertake such a survey cannot be presumptively assumed, neither by ourselves as editors, nor by the individual contributors. There are no innocent starting-points. And yet, this does not imply an abdication of the responsibility to engage critically with these rapidly evolving discourses. Rather, the aim of the volume is precisely to draw attention to an extant body of critical scholarship that assumes this task. Not only do these essays individually offer nuanced accounts from a range of contexts in which human-rights advocacy and transitional-justice initiatives are increasingly in collision with development projects, programmes and objectives, 97 but collectively, they might be read as the beginning, partial and evocative, to be sure, of a methodological mapping of a re-invigorated and globalised field of critical legal scholarship.
In the first part of the volume, the chapters explore the dimensions and dynamics of human-rights discourse in the development context. 98 In recent years, the apparent convergence between the fields of human rights and development, 99 as expressed in various documents issued by the UN and by development institutions such as the World Bank, have attracted both praise and support from scholars and development practitioners. 100 Yet, human rights and development, until quite recently, as a matter of professional expertise as well as practical application, had, for a long time, moved along separate tracks. 101 Indeed, in many post-independence contexts, they were understood as emanating from distinct sources, requiring different sets of policies and programmes, and presenting potentially conflicting demands. 102 In light of this history, contemporary approaches that posit human rights and development as not only potentially congenial, but also axiomatically and self-evidently so, beg further inquiry. 103 As one of our authors has observed elsewhere:
"despite the incorporation of human rights into the development agenda and efforts to represent the promotion of both human rights and development as fundamentally , identify the effort to find "ways in which the strengths, resources, and support of the international human rights and development communities can be mobilized in order to reinforce one another in their efforts to achieve shared goals" as a key objective of that landmark edited collection. 101 Issa Shivji, (1999) "Constructing a New Rights Regime: Prospects, Problems, Prospects", (1999) 8 Social and Legal Studies, p 259: "On the global terrain of social and political discourse, the developmental and the human rights discourses were locked in battle. They were polarized and became mutually exclusive. This meant that the developmental discourse and the human rights discourse ran parallel." 102 See, for example, Shivji, ibid., at 260, where he observes that: "the liberal theory (of rights) ruled out of court any link between individual rights and economic justice, while developmental theory was prepared to sacrifice individual rights in the pursuit of socio-economic justice. "we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed." 112 Since the late 1990s, a growing number of international institutions and agencies have taken up this call to move towards a more integrated, or comprehensive, approach. 113 At the level of practice, one effect of these developments can be traced through the proliferation of projects under the increasingly capacious category of the "Rule of Law". 114 Our review of the "convergence" literature reveals a tendency to focus on the ways in which the fields can, or should, mutually enforce each other. 115 It is not uncommon to trace convergences between transitional justice and development upon the basis of their shared aspirations for a better future for the citizens of a particular nation, for example. The contributors to this volume, however, remind us to attend to the ways in which these types of discussion already assume the illusory narrative of progress that lies at the heart of the development project. 116 Along a different vector, even very robust and otherwise critical analyses of the relationship between development and human rights tend to focus on potential compatibilities, rather than on conflicts. 117 Yet, the enthusiasm with which the discussion of potential synergies between the fields of development, human rights, and transitional justice has been embraced by both scholars and practitioners has drawn scholarly and public attention away from the difficult choices and necessary trade-offs that are a routine part of the development enterprise. 118 Rather than joining with the institutional or scholarly quest for an "integrated approach", a number of the essays in this volume identify this move (towards a "comprehensive approach") as a key aspect of contemporary developments which calls for a more differentiated analysis and critique. 119 One thing that is of particular interest to us is the way in which law, in its technocratic guise, is increasingly understood as instrumental to each of these fields: human rights, development and transitional justice. 120 In a context in which enduring solutions to the world's problems, such as the slogan inscribed on the entrance to the World Bank Building in New York; "Our dream is a world free of poverty", continue to elude the international community, institutions such as the World Bank have embraced the "rule of law" as a development strategy. 121 The "rule of law" is also understood as fundamental to the success of transitional-justice initiatives, and is seen as essential to greater realisation of international human rights within given states. The turn to law plays an analogous role in each of these fields: in the context of deeply-politicised policy decisions, a technocratic understanding of the "rule of law" both grounds and legitimates the interventions of international agencies in the domestic affairs of states. In this account, it is the understanding of law itself, and particularly the specific role which can be played by a particular conception of the "rule of law" in the international arena that is in transition, rather than human rights, development or transitional justice as such.
Our approach stands in contrast to previous exercises in "bridge-building" between these fields, which have sought to draw these separate strands together from within the functional logics or shared foundational assumptions of one, or occasionally, two fields. 122 of the risks presented by the convergence of the teleologies of human rights, development, and transition. Consequently, it is not surprising that many of these chapters are cautious and cautionary, rather than celebratory, regarding recent developments.
In our contemporary engagement with critical scholarship on development, human rights and transitional justice, we have found it useful to re-visit the landmark critique of law and development formulated by David Trubek and Marc Galanter, who identified three categories, or grounds of critique. These are the critique of universality, referring to the ethnocentrism of the liberal legalist paradigm, the critique of formal law's potency and the significance of informal ordering mechanisms, and the "dark face" of legal reform critique, which acknowledges that reform efforts may frequently have consequences such as empowering élites, or containing protest, not intended by liberal reformers. 123 And, although these insights have been taken up and expanded up by critical scholars in a great many fields over the intervening decades, the persistence of ambitious, formalist and instrumental approaches to law reform in development-and transitional-justice projects, most recently reframed in the language of rights, suggest that legal scholars and lawyers in development contexts continue to be loathe to abandon their disciplinary commitments to legal efficacy, even in the face of considerable evidence to the contrary. For example, a number of scholars have recently both extended and illustrated the argument that, in the encounter with development agencies, human rights have largely become re-formulated as a mode of regulation, in a manner that largely neutralises their potential to be used in contentious politics. 124 At the same time, critical scholarship also reminds us that the role of political mobilisation on the part of emergent activist groups within this development has never been more significant. 125 Kerry Rittich sums it up well when she notes that "in second generation reforms, human rights are better understood not as the answer to the social deficit but as the terrain of struggle". 126 In this contested and uncertain landscape, the work of critical legal scholars -including those whose essays are included in this collection and the many others cited herein -plays an increasingly vital role in questioning assumptions, containing expectations, and challenging the power of entrenched institutions. The contributions to the present volume mark important milestones in the continuing engagement with law's role in development and transitional justice, and we trust that our readers will find in them a host of helpful and inspiring introductions to a field of discourse which is of growing importanceboth in inter-disciplinary scholarship as well as in practice.
